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Between Positivism and Post-modernity? Critical Reflections on Jock 




The Exclusive Society (1999) represents Jock Young’s most recent addition to his long 
and distinguished corpus of criminological works. Quite apart from Young’s stature 
as something of an éminence grise in the discipline, the book may be considered a 
notable ‘landmark’ in criminological theory for a number of reasons. Firstly, as is 
well known, Young’s influential career has charted (and in important ways helped 
drive) the various trajectories and disputes in ‘Left’ criminology from the 1960s 
onwards. Hence his writings provide the ‘historian’ of recent criminological thought 
with insights into the perilous and contested attempts by self-styled ‘left 
criminologists’ to negotiate a position of critical relevance within a politically charged 
and socially sensitive field. As such, this latest contribution to Leftist agenda-setting 
might warrant careful scrutiny by those looking to discern new paths for critical 
thinking, in what continue to be troubled times for those committed to a socially 
progressive treatment of crime and criminal justice. Secondly, the book represents an 
implicit yet pointed chastisement of criminology’s insular tendencies, delivered by 
one of its own doyen. Perhaps more that any other recent contribution by an 
established criminological voice, the book attempts to open-up the discipline’s 
discourse to developments in the cognate fields of social, cultural and political theory.  
In the various short reviews received since publication, the book’s theoretical 
ambition has garnered both considerable praise (Loader, 2000; Waite 2000; Lippens, 
2001) and provoked some incisive critical comments (Smith, 2000; Williams, 2000).  
This essay represents an attempt to reflect critically on Young’s theoretical agenda 
and social-political prescriptions in a sustained manner. By doing so, we suggest, 
useful insights can be garnered into both the ongoing difficulties faced by a leftist 
criminology, and the equally dilemmatic character of the wider and influential 
developments in social theory upon which it might seek to draw.  At the same time, 
we can consider the problematic nature of narratives of modernity that over-
homogenise and universalise experiences of modern societies and their development.  
‘Modernity’ can be understood as a highly differentiated set of processes in which 
‘inclusion’ for some is dependent upon ‘exclusion’ for others. 
  
The paper proceeds by first providing a theoretical synopsis of Young’s 
argument in The Exclusive Society.  The second section examines this argument in 
relation to Young’s earlier Left Realism, arguing that, underpinning a dramatic 
redirection and revision of Young’s work toward social, cultural and political 
theorisation, are recognisable Left Realist tenets. The third section turns to the 
unacknowledged recuperation of sociological positivism underpinning Young’s 
thesis, where Young’s realism disposes him favourably toward developing a 
criminological account that prioritises causative explanation over interpretation, and 
which locates criminogenic mechanisms in structural and cultural processes. We 
argue that in this regard Young’s position is somewhat at variance with his depiction 
of “social positivism” as an exhausted paradigm, located within the legislative 
aspirations of a now obsolete ‘modernity’.  In the final section we examine the 
depiction of this modernity, arguing that it represents what has been described 
(O’Brien and Penna, 1996) as a narrative of modern society that obscures evidence of 
modernity’s exclusionary mechanisms, mechanisms that ensure that inclusion for 
some can only be achieved through exclusion for others.  In other words, exclusion 




A Theoretical Synopsis 
 
While various dimensions of Young’s analysis will receive sustained attention 
throughout this paper, it is both useful and appropriate to begin with a brief synopsis 
of the book’s general argument and approach through a survey of the key themes that 
organise its arguments. 
Its basic conceptual coordinates can be discerned, in the first instance, from its 
subtitle – ‘Social Exclusion, Crime and Difference in Late Modernity’.  These four 
terms demarcate the confluence of themes that provide both the book’s substantive 
concerns, and the theoretical and conceptual frame through which Young seeks to 
address them. The yoking of ‘social exclusion’ with ‘crime’ intimates the deep-seated 
causal connections that, according to Young, underpin and increasingly exacerbate the 
‘problem of crime’, and simultaneously frustrate attempts to address this problem by 
sole recourse to the intensification of ‘crime control’ and/or penal severity. In other 
words, the book seeks to reconnect the ‘crime debate’ to that about socio-economic 
marginalisation, in explicit rejection of those who advocate the authoritarian 
‘remoralisation’ of a supposedly dysfunctional ‘underclass’ through social, legal and 
economic sanctions (‘zero tolerance’, ‘prison works’, ‘welfare dependence’, and so on 
being its familiar catchwords). Keeping abreast of shifting theoretical and policy 
debates, Young casts the problem of marginality in the language of ‘social exclusion’ 
so as to highlight its multiple and inter-locking dimensions, supplementing the 
discourse on ‘poverty’ with a sensitivity to the extra-economic (social, political, 
spatial and cultural) dimensions of disenfranchisement. Yet, in good sociological 
fashion, Young isn’t content to merely map the dimensions of social exclusion, but 
seeks to locate its genesis in both the structural and cultural transformation of 
‘modern’ society.  
Structurally speaking, the perpetuation of socio-economic precariousness is 
attributed to the ‘crisis’ of the post-war ‘Fordist’ regime of production, which 
provided stable employment opportunities for an industrial working class, yoked to a 
welfarist state strategy that sought to furnish social protection ‘from the cradle to the 
grave’. This regime, Young argues, was fundamentally ‘inclusivist’ in orientation, 
seeking to accommodate a socio-economically diverse population within a framework 
that combined work and welfare, buoyed up by a booming economy and (male) ‘full’ 
employment. In this regime, the socially marginal and ‘difficult’ were approached as 
available for incorporation. This regime underwent crisis, and subsequent 
transformation, from the late 1960s onwards, yielding a set socio-economic 
arrangements characterised by chronically high, casualised and unstable employment; 
deskilling and devalorisation of manual labour; and the rise of a ‘white-collar’ and 
service sector that drew increasing numbers of women into the labour market.  Hence, 
for Young, currently entrenched patterns of socio-economic division and exclusion 
are the correlate of this structural crisis and subsequent ‘post-Fordist’ resettlement. 
The increasing disparities in income distribution, along with the dismantling of 
welfarist inclusion by a state in crisis, have served to further marginalize and 
stigmatise an already disadvantaged sector of society. The conditions of economic 
precariousness prevalent throughout the social structure, and the persistent presence 
of a marginal 30% without employment or opportunity at its bottom, has fostered 
widespread ‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens, 1991) and fear. This has become 
manifest in punitive scapegoating of the poor on the one hand; and on the other, the 
incitement of frustration, resentment and reactive violence on the part of the excluded 
(an argument which in notable ways parallels that of Young’s erstwhile collaborator, 
the late Ian Taylor, whose Crime in Context (2000) draws similar connections 
between crime, fear, exclusion and the post-Fordist transformation of ‘market 
society’). In short, a poisonous brew of market individualism and ‘relative 
deprivation’ are crucial causal antecedents of both an explosion in crime and anti-
social behaviour, and an increasingly frantic and repressive agenda of crime control 
that seeks to manage its own ‘residuum’, the new ‘dangerous classes’.  
The socio-economic transformation of society has been paralleled by a socio-
cultural reconfiguration, linked in part to the crisis of Fordism. For Young, the post-
war regime of production and consumption was anchored and reflected in a set of 
stabilised social institutions and homogeneous cultural identities. These included 
community relations based on class and occupational affinity, and a nuclear family 
with its attendant sexual division of labour. Paralleling recent arguments by Richard 
Sennett (1998) and Zygmunt Bauman (2001), Young sees these older certainties 
undermined as their supporting socio-economic arrangements have undergone 
irretrievable breakdown. The result has been an explosion of ‘difference’, the 
pluralisation and fragmentation of identities and lifestyles. These are today met with 
contradictory responses, simultaneously valorising difference (under the guise of 
market individualism and consumer choice) on the one hand, and persecuting it (in the 
form of reactive and ‘essentialist’ yearnings to purify and restore a lost homogeneity) 
on the other. Moreover, the dissolution of working class communities has bequeathed 
an urban landscape beset by predation and incivility, in which the poor prey upon 
their neighbours. However, Young eschews socio-economic reductionism in 
accounting for cultural change, by drawing upon the ‘meta-theories’ of ‘reflexive 
modernity’, ‘late modernity’ and ‘risk society’ developed by the likes of Ulrich Beck 
and Anthony Giddens. From this viewpoint, the ‘explosion of difference’, and the 
fears and responses it engenders, are part of an inexorable inner dynamic of modernity 
itself, its tendency to reflexively undermine all existing socio-cultural coordinates, to 
‘detraditionalise’ society, to ‘set free’ individuals to self-organise a social biography 
that is increasingly contingent and malleable. Again, this incites a range of responses 
that are ambivalent and contradictory: the celebration of individual liberation; 
defensive introversion, privatism, and isolationism; the aggressive targeting of those 
identified as the carriers of threatening cultural, sexual, gender or ethnic difference; to 
a reactionary moralism that pins its hopes on restoring former certainties. Hence, 
through a series of theoretical associations, Young links crime, fear and incivility 
(their inexorable rise and the fearful responses they inspire) with both the release of 
‘difference’ and the entrenchment of social divisions that are their structural and 
cultural determinants.    
Young’s sociological analysis of this complex imbrication of social exclusion, 
crime and difference is, in the latter parts of the book, supplemented by a foray into 
political theory, driven by a commitment to seek a forward-looking prescription for 
the current malaise. He rejects backward-harking calls to restore the ‘golden age’ of 
the post-war inclusive society, on both sociological and political grounds. 
Sociologically, the clock cannot be turned back. Economic, technological and global 
social change have consigned to impracticality the formula of a centralist nation-state, 
providing redistribution via welfare, and stability via Keynesian macro-economics.  
Similarly, socio-cultural homogeneity has given way to a discovery of difference and 
otherness that cannot be simply effaced, no matter how much conservatives might 
hanker after ‘Family Values’ and the like, or nostalgic leftists might dream of a world 
of working class collectivism (along with its unarticulated white, male hegemony). 
Moreover, from a moral-political standpoint, such a return would merely reproduce 
pernicious essentialisms, since the universalism of the old inclusive society always 
underwrote an insidious violence, denying Others the right to exist on anything other 
than its own terms. As an alternative, Young draws upon the recent political-
theoretical work of Nancy Fraser (1997), which attempts to find a rapprochement 
between the politics of economic redistribution and the more recent agenda of the 
cultural recognition of difference (or ‘identity politics’ as it’s often called). For 
Young, the redistributive imperative could be met by a radical ‘meritocracy’, one that 
permits the genuine connection of reward with merit, thereby offering sustainable 
paths out of economic exclusion and marginality (pp. 185-189). The aspiration for 
cultural recognition, on the other hand, could be met by a ‘transformative 
multiculturalism’, in which ‘low intensity’ communities with permeable, non-
essentialised identities and borders could co-exist (pp. 179-182). 
 
Left Realism Revised? 
 
Having charted the main theoretical coordinates and lines of argument presented by 
Young, we can now turn to consider their cogency, significance and wider 
criminological implications. Perhaps the first question, to many readers’ minds, will 
concern the relationship of Young’s excursus to his previous work. Given our 
introductory remarks about Young’s pivotal role in the development of left 
criminological thinking, it behoves us to reflect on the continuity or otherwise of this 
latest work with the ‘Left Realist’ position that he pioneered in the 1980s (see, for 
example, Young 1986, 1987, 1992). This work, of course, was the target of much 
opprobrium from those who, insistent upon flying the flag of ‘critical criminology’, 
saw it as a capitulation to the law-and-order agenda of Thatcherism. For Young on the 
other hand, it was a necessary move to rescue Left criminology from its multiple 
‘Achilles heels’: a ‘romantic’ propensity to ‘idealise’ crime as a form of class politics; 
a ‘denial’ of people’s experience of crime by dissolving it into a social construction; 
and the perceived self-absorption and political/policy irrelevance to which critical 
criminology had seemingly consigned itself (for an incisive examination of critical 
criminology’s recent career, trials, and tribulations, see Hall, 2002). Does Young’s 
latest work represent a reassertion of ‘Left Realist’ principles? It’s reformulation? It’s 
abandonment in favour of an alternative criminological paradigm or programme? The 
evidence, we would suggest, is contradictory.  
One recent reviewer, recalling “the heroic debates between left realists and 
their Others”, discerns that Young “has tried to move beyond them in The Exclusive 
Society” (Lippens, 2001: 570)1. This assessment alludes to the concerted criticism of 
Left Realism on the grounds that, in its headlong rush to demonstrate its relevance for 
‘administrative criminology’, it had fatally restricted its vision to an empiricist 
mapping of crime levels and distributions (manifest most notably in the centrality 
accorded to crime and victimisation surveys). In doing so, its critics argued, Young 
and his colleagues had consigned wider critical social, political and cultural reflection 
to the margins. The Left Realist drive for relevance had, in effect, taken a retrograde 
step by foregoing the critical-theoretical apparatus (pioneered by Young amongst 
others) that could situate crime in a wider framework capable of addressing the role of 
state power, class politics, and the like, or of offering a cogent sociological account of 
its causes and genesis (see Sim et al, 1987; McMahon, 1988; Walklate, 1998). In this 
respect, The Exclusive Society does indeed represent something of a volte face. Not 
only have wider social, political and cultural theoretical debates been admitted, but 
they have also come to take centre stage. Indeed, as Young notes in his 
Acknowledgements, the ‘book started off as one on criminology and ended up as one 
on cultural studies and political philosophy’.  Moreover, the theoretical resources 
mobilised are manifold (a smorgasbord, one reviewer opined (Williams, 2000), and 
pitch their accounts at the macro (or even ‘meta’) level, as they seek to chart 
wholesale, ‘ephocal’ transformations in social, cultural and political formations. 
Hence Young, in attempting to insert ‘crime’ into the interstices of ‘grand theories’ 
about ‘modernity’, seeks to bring criminological concerns into the broadest contextual 
focus possible. 
                                                
1
 Indeed, as Simon Cottee (2002: 388) has recently noted, Young’s discussion of those positions 
previously derided as ‘left idealist’ appears much more conciliatory in his latest work. 
However, this apparent discontinuity with Left Realism must be counter-
balanced by aspects of the book that demonstrate its enduring (if unacknowledged) 
commitment to the principles staked-out by the earlier work. Hence another reviewer 
felt confident in asserting that The Exclusive Society “has continued to develop the 
main themes of realism” (Smith, 2000: 320). These include, firstly, the claim that 
‘street crime’ is a ‘real problem’, and one that impacts disproportionately upon the 
already marginalised and disadvantaged. Consequently, a Left criminology worth the 
name ought give it serious address, and attempt to find practical strategies for its 
reduction. Secondly, that inequity in the administration of justice exacerbates the 
problem by fostering resentment and distrust of its agencies, thereby entrenching the 
problem of crime; hence the promotion of a more equitable and sensitive application 
of criminal law is an important goal in leftist criminological initiatives. And thirdly 
that, by way of an explanation for the (apparent) preponderance of crime perpetrated 
by those located in the most disadvantaged social positions, the concept of ‘relative 
deprivation’ provides an indispensable resource.  At various points throughout the 
book, Young reiterates these Left Realist claims: the Left Idealist refusal to treat 
crime and its genesis as a serious problem (1); the tendency of labelling theory 
(presented here as proto-postmodernism) to view crime as a social construct (39-40); 
and the importance of ‘relative deprivation’ as an explanatory resource in addressing a 
real increase in crime (48, 96) of which the disenfranchised working classes are both 
perpetrators and victims (16). Hence, underpinning what appears a dramatic 
redirection toward social, cultural and political theorisation, recognisable Left Realist 
tenets are indeed at play. However, continuities with Left Realism notwithstanding, 
the turn to more recent trends in social and cultural theory effect a marked revision of 
Young’s criminological vision (and a not entirely beneficial one - we will say more on 
this later in the essay).  
 
The Long Shadow of Sociological Positivism? 
 
For the moment, we should like to focus upon another significant feature of the thesis 
presented in The Exclusive Society, namely its (unacknowledged) recuperation of 
theoretical and methodological motifs associated with sociological positivism. This, 
we suggest, takes two main forms: firstly, the book’s implicit dependence upon 
empirically apparent patterns in offending as the basis for developing a causal 
hypothesis to explain said behaviour; and secondly, an explicit appropriation of 
Robert Merton’s structural sociology of deviance. We tackle each of these dimensions 
in turn. 
The basic rationale of Young’s thesis is that recent decades have witnessed a 
profound change vis-à-vis crime, namely that there has been an inexorable rise in 
crime (along with associated forms of ‘anti-social behaviour’ and ‘incivility’). It is 
this apparent ‘crime problem’ that necessitates Young’s development of an 
explanatory hypothesis that finds its causes in social exclusion, which in turn is the 
effect of social-structural and cultural transformations. Hence, for Young, there is an 
empirical social phenomenon (‘rising crime’) that demands a sociological and 
criminological explanation. Moreover, and perhaps even more tellingly, the reality of 
a quantum rise in crime is derived from empirical regularities manifest in survey data.  
In other words, the entire raison d’etre of the book depends upon there in fact having 
been a ‘real increase’ in crime, and the evidence for such an increase is derived from 
results manifest in crime surveys. The faith placed by Young in such surveys as 
providing conclusive evidence for a ‘quantum rise in crime’ (and, indeed, the 
methodological conviction that techniques of empirical social measurement are able 
to conclusively uncover the ‘reality’ of crime) bespeak a quintessentially positivistic 
faith in the measurability of crime as a ‘social fact’.  In fairness, Young devotes 
considerable attention to exploring, variously, the problem of the ‘dark figure’; the 
heretofore ‘hidden’ dimensions of crime uncovered by work on ‘white-collar crime’ 
and by feminist criminologists; and the role of criminal justice agencies in 
constructing crime and its apparent levels and social distribution, as revealed 
variously by labelling theory, left idealism, moral panic theory, abolitionism and 
social constructionism (35-45).   
 
However, despite these (and other) critical ‘deconstructions’ of crime figures, 
Young takes the reality of ‘rising crime’ as sufficiently robust as to pin the entire 
thesis of the book upon it. Implicitly, Young appears to be suggesting that the 
development of crime surveys (so favoured by Left Realism) have effectively ‘filled-
in the blanks’ on the ‘dark figure’, thereby giving us a reliable view of the real 
underlying patterns and trends in offending behaviour. This seems to fly in the face of 
what we know about the methodological limits of such survey methods, which cannot 
justifiably be deemed to give us a picture of crime that is in essence any more 
‘objective’ than the ‘official statistics’ they sought to supplement or challenge (see, 
for example, Michalowski, 1991; Nelken, 1994; Maguire, 1997).  Indeed, at various 
points, Young slips between talk of ‘rising crime figures’, ‘perceptions of crime’ and 
such like on the one hand, and the ‘rise in crime’ on the other (17, 31-2, 35, 69, 122); 
having acknowledged that crime figures are socially and politically contingent 
constructs that ‘reveal’ crime in different ways, Young then falls back into asserting a 
real rise in crime, whose sole evidential basis are those very figures. In other words, 
something of an argumentative ‘sleight-of-hand’ enables Young to repeatedly claim 
an ‘explosion of crime’ (which is then subject to explanation), despite the manifold 
reasons why criminologists have come to look upon such empirical generalisations 
about the ‘reality of crime’ with considerable scepticism. 
The second strand of Young’s ‘positivism’ relates to his appropriation of 
Merton’s account of the social-structural causes of offending behaviour presented in 
“Social Structure and Anomie” (1938).  It will be recalled that, in this sociological 
classic, Merton located the causes of (working class) crime in the ‘strain’ effected by 
tensions between dominant culturally-defined goals and the unequal social 
distribution of the legitimate means for achieving those goals. Young re-appropriates 
Merton, locating the causes of rising crime in the confluence between social exclusion 
(deprivation of legitimate means) and the rise of a set of cultural expectations that 
place emphasis upon individual gains via the market mechanisms of a consumer 
society (culturally-approved goals) (48, 50, 85, 96). The salience of Merton’s 
analysis, originally formulated in relation to the individualistic, achievement- and 
monetarily-oriented culture of American capitalism, resides in the rise of seemingly 
similar cultural values under the aegis of Thatcherism. The ascendance of a market-
oriented acquisitive individualism, combined with the atrophy of communal ties of 
working-class solidarity, reproduces the culturally prescribed goals that featured in 
Merton’s account. When combined with the systematically entrenched exclusion and 
disenfranchisement of those at the ‘bottom’ of the social hierarchy, the conditions are 
established for the anomic adaptations so famously elaborated by Merton.   
There is considerable virtue in revisiting the ‘classics’ in addressing current 
concerns (rather than consigning them to the scrap-heap of sociological and 
criminological history by pronouncing their current irrelevance; or worse, casting 
‘political’ aspersions on their supposed thraldom to contemporary bête-noirs such as 
‘Enlightenment universalism’ or ‘modernism’). However, in turning to Merton, 
Young concedes an obvious hostage to fortune. Reviving ‘strain theory’ also means 
taking-on some of its more obviously apparent flaws. Most prominent amongst these 
is that Merton’s account depends crucially upon there being a demonstrable 
differential distribution of offences across the class structure; it is precisely the 
preponderance of offending behaviour in the ‘lower’ social strata that warrants an 
explanation for crime that emphasises exclusion from the legitimate opportunity 
structure. Merton has been rightly criticised over the decades for having 
unproblematically assumed (on the basis of the available statistical evidence) that the 
‘lower’ social classes were in fact responsible for a disproportionate amount of 
offending behaviour. Young, by making the same connection between social 
marginality and offending behaviour, leaves himself vulnerable to this selfsame 
objection. Moreover, as already noted, readers today are much more likely to look 
askance at an account that takes empirical measures of crime as sufficient evidence 
that the problem of offending is a problem of the working (or ‘under’) classes. 
Conversely, an account focussed on socially excluded offenders (and exclusion as a 
key ‘motivation’ for offending) finds itself unable to adequately account for offending 
located amongst the ‘powerful’ elsewhere in the social structure. An account that 
places its emphasis so squarely on the excluded as the source of a massive rise in 
crime (however sympathetically their plight is presented) threatens to unwittingly 
reproduce the centuries-old identification of criminal conduct with socially 
marginalised groups. 
At various points in the book, Young depicts criminological positivism as a 
manifest failure; in particular, the causal explanation of crime as emanating from “bad 
social conditions” was exploded by the simultaneous rise in levels of prosperity and 
crime in the post-War years (35). Young distances himself from this “social 
positivism” by positioning Merton as a critic of positivism; hence, while appropriating 
Merton, Young leaves himself free of any positivist ‘taint’. He locates Merton’s 
supposed repudiation of positivism in his (Merton’s) rejection of poverty as a causal 
explanation for criminal behaviour, necessitating the subsequent introduction of 
cultural values (especially “a commonly shared system of success symbols” (1938: 
677)) as a crucial factor.  Thus, in Young’s view, the essence of a ‘positivist’ account 
is its location of the causes for criminal behaviour in the structure of socio-economic 
conditions. By introducing ‘culture’ into the equation, positivism has been effectively 
set aside. However, such a rendition is, on reflection, not entirely convincing. The 
‘essence’ of positivism does not reside in the favouring of socio-economic factors as 
causal explananda, nor does the introduction of ‘culture’ into the explanatory equation 
make an account anti-positivist. In fact, the heart of Merton’s “social positivism” (and 
by implication Young’s) resides in the attempt to locate the objective causes of 
individual behaviour. These causes can be located in a cultural system just as well as 
a socio-economic one. What Merton’s account does (in good positivist fashion) is 
reject poverty as a sufficient causal condition (since there is an empirically observable 
disjunction between levels of poverty and levels of crime across societies), and 
introduce a further necessary condition (a common system of cultural values 
emphasising individual success) that, in conjunction with poverty, furnishes the causal 
antecedents for crime2. At this juncture, it is worth recalling David Matza’s (1964) 
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 On the one hand Merton (1936) sought to curb the more deterministic inclinations of positivist 
well-known excursus on the ‘Positive Delinquent’. He points out that a positivism that 
complexifies its account by introducing multiple necessary causal conditions for a 
given behavioural outcome is not less positivist for that (just more unwieldy, 
qualified, and more localised in its explanatory ambit). Young, adopting Merton’s 
thesis as his own, rephrases it thus: “Crime occurs where there is cultural inclusion 
and structural exclusion” (81: emphasis in the original). Hence it is in the conjunction 
of two necessary conditions (one cultural-systemic the other social-structural) that the 
causes of crime are to be found – what could be more positivist than this?3   
 
The foregoing is not intended as a pillory, an attempt to discount Young’s 
thesis by recourse to methodological ‘name calling’. Despite the many and various 
assaults on sociological positivism down the years (from Weberian 
Verstehendesoziologie, through phenomenology, to postmodernism), the viability of 
an explanatory social science has by no means been conclusively undermined. Indeed, 
the very fact that this methodological dispute is on-going demonstrates the resilience 
and enduring appeal of a social science, however formulated, that could furnish an 
‘objective’ account of social action framed in terms of ‘structures’ and ‘causes’. 
Hence, for example, we have seen recent attempts to revive an ‘objectivist’ 
                                                                                                                                        
sociology by emphasising the purposive character of social action. Yet, on the other, by subsuming 
such action under the coordinates provided by a systemic cultural configuration, he largely recuperated 
it within the ambit of positivist causation - hence the criticism that his anomic actor is overly ‘socially-
determined’. For more on this see Matza 1964, 1969, and discussion in Sumner, 1994: 76-78.    
3
 An analogous instance of the use of ‘culture’ and ‘structure’ in a positivist explanation for conduct is 
Durkheim’s  (1970; orig. 1897) famous account of ‘anomic suicide’. Here, it is the combination of 
cultural factors (for example, normlessness, rising expectations) and rapid social-structural change that 
is used to furnish a causal explanation. Similarly, empirically evident differences in suicide rates 
between social groups (such as Catholics and Protestants) are attributed to differences in their cultural 
affiliations.  It is in their attachment to different systems of meaning that their differing propensities to 
take their own lives are to be found. Here, culture is cause and suicide is effect. Subsequent critiques of 
Durkheim’s account have stressed his location of causes for action in structural and cultural variables, 
rather than interpretively examining the understandings that the actors themselves might have of their 
situation and actions (see, for example, Douglas, 1967 and Atkinson, 1978; also Hughes & Sharrock, 
1997: 30-40, on Durkheim’s positivist methodology). The same point can be levelled at Merton’s 
subsumation of action to structural and cultural factors that are seen as the causal antecedents of the 
action. 
methodological programme under the aegis of ‘critical realism’ (see, for example, 
Sayer, 2000). It’s worth noting that, in the formulation of Left Realism in the 1980s, 
Young had already allied himself with an epistemology and ontology that views 
structures as real, mind-independent features of the social world, which act causally to 
generate behavioural effects. What is interesting in the present context is that Young’s 
‘realism’ may be seen to dispose him favourably toward developing a criminological 
account that favours causative explanation over interpretation, and which locates 
criminogenic mechanisms in the structural and cultural situation of social actors4. In 
this regard, Young’s own revival of Merton’s positivist inclination is somewhat at 
odds with his depiction of social positivism as an exhausted paradigm, one that is to 
be located within the legislative aspirations of a now defunct ‘modernity’.  It may 
well indicate the on-going relevance and centrality of positivist aspirations for 
contemporary criminology, as it seeks to locate criminogenic mechanisms at the level 




Young’s thesis is predicated upon a historical dualism between ‘inclusive’ and 
‘exclusive’ society, paralleling Bauman’s temporalised distinction between stable, 
homogenising modernity (‘solid’) and new destabilised, disordered and conflictual 
order (‘liquid’) (cf. Bauman, 2000). Young draws a congruent socio-anthropological 
distinction between modern, ‘anthropophagic’ society (that assimilates or consumes 
difference) and late modern, ‘anthropoemic’ society (that ejects difference). This 
desire to either assimilate (and thus eliminate) or exclude (and thus deny) difference 
                                                
4
 On the connections between Young’s Left Realism and earlier positivist criminology, see also Smart 
(1990) 
appears to be based on an ontological assumption about ‘human nature’: that there is a 
persistent will to closure, that the experience of the uncertain and the indeterminate 
(‘ambivalence’ in Bauman’s terms) provokes an effort to efface the problematic 
element. As has been argued elsewhere, this dualism is reductive and empirically 
problematic (Yar, 2002). A further problem is that to propose an argument that rests 
on the concepts of ‘modernity’ and ‘exclusion’ requires a much more sustained 
discussion of both concepts.  We argue here that the picture of modernity presented 
suffers from a common problem characterizing models of transition, that of drawing 
an overly homogenised portrait of the past, with a correspondingly overly 
homogenised portrait of the present, with the differences between them emphasized 
but the continuities omitted (Kumar, 1995).   
 
 ‘Modernity’ in Young’s account is but a short historical moment, that of the 
Keynesian, corporatist, social-democratic society obtaining in some Western countries 
from roughly 1948 to the 1960s. Whilst drawing upon a particular understanding of 
modernity (see below), what is developed is not a historically detailed argument of 
processes of modernization (such as rationalization, detraditionalisation and 
differentitiation), nor of the ambivalent and contradictory dynamics of modernity (see 
Penna, et al, 1999).  Rather, the immediate post-war years are given ontological status 
as an inclusive social formation.  This is a highly problematic rendition.  It is 
empirically suspect, tending to over-emphasise ‘inclusivity’ of past social and 
political regimes by deriving its empirical picture from juridical-political theory and 
discourse and assuming that the Marshallian analysis of social citizenship accurately 
captures the reality of the socio-economic and political regimes of those years. Such 
an account can only be sustained by ignoring other investigations that suggest a 
persistence of systematic mechanisms and patterns of selective social exclusion, from 
the inceptions of centralised responses to the ‘social problem’ (in late Georgian 
England), continuing throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. It is not clear that there 
once was ‘an inclusive society’ (despite political voices on the centre-left advocating 
redistributivist welfarism and the expansion of social citizenship), and that this has 
given way to its antithesis. In our view, this position can be more usefully understood 
as a dominant narrative of modernity, encompassing a particular discourse of 
inclusion and exclusion that has been fiercely challenged from other perspectives. 
Young’s account contains many features of what O’Brien and Penna (1996) 
describe as an historical narrative of modernity, where modernising processes are seen 
to occur across several areas of social life at more or less the same time.  Here, 
citizenship, or inclusion, is held to be a consequence of modernity, or, more 
accurately, modernisation. For Young, the replacement of inclusionary by 
exclusionary processes marks a transition to a late modern, post-Fordist or possibly 
post-modern society.  The ‘late’ or ‘post’ prefix has become a shorthand for an 
extensive series of debates about how to understand social change, dealing with 
concepts of structure and agency, history, culture, subjectivity, public and private, 
identity, ethics and science.  There is little consensus over how to interprete historical 
processes and, consequently, there are several distinct theoretical ways in which the 
question of 'the modern' can be posed.  A common approach is to situate the 
development of social protection systems (welfare and criminal justice policies and 
systems) in historical processes of class conflict, nation-building, industrialisation and 
political democratization, and it is this approach that underpins Marshall's (1950) 
account of the growth of social citizenship, a dominant narrative of citizenship that 
informs much mainstream work (see for example, Riley, 1992, p188; see also Crook 
et al, 1992, pp118-119).  This narrative derives from the ‘modernity thesis’, in which 
the emergence and organisation of social protection systems is situated in relation to 
wider processes of socio-political development.  The modernity thesis proposes that, 
underlying all the observable differences in experiences, beliefs, cultural 
interpretations and social goals, there persists a unity or direction to human history as 
a whole: modernity universalises processes of differentiation, detraditionalisation and 
rationalisation (c.f., O’Brien and Penna, 1996; 1998).   
This perspective depends importantly upon the institutionalisation of particular 
world-views associated with the eighteenth century enlightenment that underpinned 
European modernization.  Consisting in the development of scientific and secular-
rational systems of analysis, philosophy and theory, the enlightenment held out the 
promise of an endless era of material progress and prosperity.  It saw the emergence 
of systematic political philosophies - such as liberalism, communism and socialism - 
concerned with freedom and justice and the conditions for their realisation. What 
these philosophies have in common is a conception of universal human constituencies 
- the 'rights of man', the proletariat, or rational individualism.  They propose a concept 
of universal subjectivity, of universal categories of identity - such as citizen, nation or 
class - which establish the foundations of membership, entitlement and rights within a 
political community.   The historical narrative of modernisation leads to struggles for 
modern citizenship (inclusion) being represented as unfolding conflicts around 
principles of universal assimilation and (primarily) class identities (O’Brien and 
Penna, 1996: 186-7). 
The post-war welfare state is usually attributed with a goal of tackling the 
unequal outcomes of market capitalism.  However, in Britain, only some inequalities 
and impoverishments were attacked by Beveridge's proposals and subsequent British 
welfare policy, leaving ‘… Racism and Sexism, and the fights against them, behind 
statues to the Nation and the White Family.'  (Williams, 1989:162).  As Williams, 
amongst others, pointed out, the gendered and ‘racialised’ political outlines of 
Beveridge's scheme were sharply criticised when the proposals were published and 
have been the source of dispute and struggle ever since.  The inequalities upon which 
the post-war welfare states and Keynesian political-economies were built were not 
peculiar to Britain; Ginsberg (1992) details similar processes in Sweden, and Esping-
Andersen (1990) has detailed the differential stratification effects of different ‘welfare 
regimes’.  However, it is not only gender and ethnic inequalities that underpinned 
post-war social organisation.  Modernity has been characterised by widespread 
institutionalisation – of people with learning disabilities, physical disabilities, 
unmarried mothers, people with mental health problems, orphans and disturbed 
children, for example.  The processes of modernisation, from the 1834 Poor Law 
Amendment Act in Britain, began with the building of workhouses and gradually 
extended to asylums, prisons, and residential facilities, seeing the segregation and 
incarceration of innumerable people. Recognition of this process of 
institutionalisation leads to two important implications for interpreting relationships 
between modernity and exclusion, one theoretical and one empirical.  
 Theoretically, the inequalities characterizing ‘high modernity’ can be 
understood not as the ‘halted march of progress’, or the outcome of impersonal forces 
propelling society into another evolutionary stage, but, rather, as an historically 
intrinsic divisive pattern of social co-ordination whose continued existence is rooted 
in and dependent upon modernity’s processes of exclusion and marginalisation.  A 
number of important developments over the past three decades have contributed to a 
sustained theoretical and empirical challenge to the historical narrative of modernity.  
The new social movements that Young mentions, that include feminist, anti-racist, 
disability, ecology, and gay and lesbian movements, forced onto the political agenda 
the social and cultural differences through which social and political policy 
programmes were structured and experienced and, furthermore, focused attention on 
the exclusionary processes upon which the centralised state social protection system 
had been constructed.  O’Brien and Penna (1998) discuss how, under the impact of 
new social movements and the ‘cultural turn’ in social theory, the debate about 
citizenship and inclusion was re-orientated to questions of social, political and cultural 
differences in status, identity, personal and social autonomy as well as questions of 
opportunities, rights and needs.  Such movements opened up the way to a 're-
visioning' of the political sphere and to the development of academic perspectives on 
the cultural and political processes through which asymmetrical differences in the 
organisation of social life are sustained.   
This revisioning detailed an intricate web of connections between the political 
and cultural construction of the inequalities that tie together people's experiences of 
class, race and gender, for example, with economic and social structures of wealth, 
access and opportunity.  Analytically, a significant amount of literature from different 
disciplines, but influenced by post-structuralist deconstructions of dominant 
enlightenment narratives, charted the way in which ‘modernity’, both as an historical 
process and as a form of society, depended upon a twin movement of both inclusion 
and exclusion.  McClintock’s (1995) account of the development of Western 
capitalism, for example, details the way in which economic dynamics were embedded 
within pre-existing inequalities of ethnicity and gender, inequalities that were 
reproduced during the development of modern societies.  The onward march of 
progress depended upon both racist and sexist ideologies and practices that comprised 
a process of exclusion from many aspects of social life. Modernity, here, comprises a 
process whereby the construction of the rights, identifications and symbols of 
powerful constituencies serves to de-construct the rights, identifications and symbols 
of less powerful others (O’Brien and Penna, 1996).  This process of deconstruction-
reconstruction can be understood as the primary vehicle through which the 
achievement and loss of statuses, opportunities and authorisations - citizenship - is 
orchestrated.  Citizenship does not, then, form a unified, singular development of 
human society but a cultural and political vehicle for organising hierarchical and 
exclusive systems of representation and social participation.   
 
What is notable in these alternative accounts of modernity is a refusal to take 
modern visions of progress, inclusion and identity at face value.  Dominant narratives 
of modernity tell its story through the voices of particular (powerful) constituents, so 
that subtle and persistent divisions in cultural status and power permeate the 
definitions and voices that record modern experiences.  Much of the literature 
challenging the dominant narrative represents a ‘politics of voice’ (O’Brien and 
Penna, 1998a): it is engaged in a fundamental reconceptualisation of the categories of 
social and political analysis so that different voices and definitions can be connected 
to their historical contexts and inserted into larger political processes and systems.  
‘Difference’ here does not simply refer to diversity - it refers to socially produced 
asymmetries between cultural spheres and their political location in hierarchies of 
domination and resistance (Mohanty, cited in O’Brien and Penna,1996:192).  Socio-
cultural 'difference', represents a position in a complex matrix of political relations 
that fracture modern categories of inclusion. 
Such an analysis draws attention to the everyday world where the lived 
experience of rights, duties, identities, and social and cultural boundaries are 
encountered and ordered.  The administrative procedures that arrange democratic 
citizenship and ‘inclusion’ obscure exclusionary processes that such procedures in 
fact organise (O’Brien and Penna, 1996).  For example, the supposedly inclusive 
period of high modernity saw the relentless segregation of people with learning 
disabilities in large psychiatric hospitals, of children with physical disabilities in large 
‘special’ residential institutions, the medicalisation and criminalisation of 
homosexuality, widespread signs on lodging houses and rented accommodation 
declaring ‘no blacks’ and ‘no Irish’, stringent immigration controls on people from 
the ex-colonies, amongst countless instances of exclusionary practices. This catalogue 
of widespread historical segregation, marginalisation and discrimination suggests that 
social exclusion can be understood as a historic product of modern democracies, 
welfare states and their politically interlocking constituencies of gender, race, class 
and other social ascriptions. 
Patterns of exclusion, disadvantage and discrimination in modern social life 
have complicated histories embedded in multiple socio-cultural connections.  
Historically, the expansion of citizenship rights has accompanied processes of nation 
building, processes rooted in gendered, homophobic and racially bounded notions of 
social inclusion (see O’Brien and Penna, 1996; 1998, and Hay, et al, 1999).  Europe’s 
colonial encounter is crucial in the development of categories of inclusion and 
exclusion, since both the formal public world of rights and entitlements and the 
informal everyday world of experience draw on the legacy and persisting effects of 
the modern European empires.  The ideologies underpinning colonialism established 
racist stereotypes of colonised peoples, and it is such constructions of ethnic (and 
other groups) that differentiate 'us' and 'them', such that the marginalisation of 'them' 
is the key to inclusion for 'us' in modern life.  These differentiations and distinctions, 
central to imperialist ideologies, are reproduced in the socio-cultural and geo-political 
structures of modern, liberal, states.  Modern societies are shot through by numerous 
public spheres making claims and counter-claims for different inclusions and 
exclusions - in the form of rights, entitlements and services (c.f., Fraser, 1994).  It is 
not possible to achieve a final resolution to these issues of inclusion because the 
modern polity is not a static, purely structural, forum in which inequalities and 
exclusions can be settled (O’Brien and Penna, 1996).  
 
There is, though, a contemporary counter-process to segregation and exclusion 
that, whilst still embedded in unequal socio-political structures, raises a further 
question for Young’s analysis.  Whilst incarceration rates have increased in relation to 
prisons, paradoxically they have decreased for other social groups.  High modernity, 
from the 1960s onwards, has seen an increasing deinstitutionalisation process 
occurring for, in particular, people with learning disabilities, mental health problems, 
and ‘looked-after’ children, formerly incarcerated in huge institutions resembling 
prisons.  Oliver and Barnes (1998), examining exclusion and inclusion in relation to 
disabled people, track a process that is described as a movement from exclusion to 
inclusion.  A similar processs of deinstitutionalisation can be observed in the field of 
children with problems (Triseliotis, 1997), and people with mental illnesses 
(Sheppard, 1997).  Such processes of deinstitutionalisation and decarceration are not 
necessarily markers of something we might call ‘inclusion’ but, they do signify a 
counter-trend to the increased segregation of people in prisons.   
  These various observations pose a number of intellectual problems when 
considering the relationship(s) between modernity and exclusion.  Increased income 
inequality and prison incarceration rates in recent British history can be attributed to 
shifting political rationales and decisions and it seems unnecessary to attribute these 
trends to impersonal forces of an abstract ‘modernity’.  If such an attribution is to be 
made and sustained, some specification of the mechanisms of forces at work that are 
intrinsic to modernity (as opposed to neo-liberal policy decisions) is required.  If 
increasing incarceration is a measure of exclusion, what are we to make of increasing 
decarceration in other areas of social life?  Which process is more significant in terms 
of claims for an ‘exclusive society’?  On what criteria do we judge?  And, finally, as 
Charles Lemert (1999:191, italics in original) put it when discussing another account 
of modernity: ‘If it turns out that there are real, incommensurable social differences 




We have suggested that Young’s account is noteworthy as an attempt to negotiate 
between criminology’s recognisable ‘pasts’ and its potential ‘futures’. This is 
undertaken through mediation between some ‘traditional’ criminological concerns, 
theories and methods, and recent developments in the wider fields of social and 
cultural theory. However, we claim that it is precisely in this negotiation that the 
tensions and difficulties in Young’s account emerge most clearly. Firstly, we have 
noted a tension between the Left Realist orientation to localised and empirically 
focused mappings of crime, and the attempt to situate crime causation within macro-
level accounts of social, political and cultural transformation. These latter accounts 
may be radically counter-intuitive vis-à-vis the ‘common sense’ perceptions of ‘real 
crime’ forwarded by the subjects of Realist research, and may be at odds with 
Realism’s emphasis upon ‘relative deprivation’ as a key explanatory resource. This 
results in a stand off between micro and macro scales, between realist and reflexive 
epistemologies, and between the validation of ‘lay’, ‘administrative’, ‘expert’ and 
‘critical’ renditions of ‘the crime problem’. Secondly, we have noted a congruent 
tension between the established positivist aspirations of criminological science and 
the recent anti-positivist orientation of the ‘cultural turn’. The attempt to adopt a 
purportedly anti-positivist stance, while simultaneously holding fast to positivist 
aspirations, results in considerable methodological confusion. Thirdly, we have noted 
how Young’s mobilisation of recent social-cultural theory has tended toward a rather 
reified and dualistic distinction between an ‘inclusive’ modernity and an ‘exclusive’ 
social formation that has supposedly supplanted it; this tendency is a flaw of many 
such social-theoretical accounts, which have tended to sacrifice historical specificity 
and complexity in favour of (theoretically and rhetorically powerful) generalisations 
about ‘modernity’, ‘post-modernity’, ‘late modernity’ and the like. The result is an 
overly dramatised distinction that (while rhetorically anchoring the conjunction 
between ‘crime’, ‘social exclusion’ and ‘late modernity’) tends to attribute the social, 
political and cultural past with a false sense of unity. 
 We would suggest that these dilemmas are not simply contingent or 
accidental (and thereby easily overcome), but are bound-up with the very attempt to 
move criminology onto the ground of recent social and cultural theory, and to do so 
while retaining in considerable part the ‘conventional’ aspiration for an aetiological 
(indeed ‘positive’) criminological science. In other words, Young’s book embodies 
many of the challenges facing critical criminology (and critical and reflexive social 
science more broadly) – viz. the choices between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ (Archer, 
2000), between ‘culture’ and ‘economy’ as explanatory foci (Ray and Sayer, 1999), 
between explanatory ‘legislation’ and hermeneutic ‘interpretation’ as models for 
social inquiry (Bauman, 1987), and between ‘reconstruction’ and ‘deconstruction’ of 
the discipline itself (Nelken et al, 1994; Cohen, 1998).  Insofar as Young’s book falls 
short of fulfilling its ambitions, this is due as much to the difficulty of the challenge as 
to any particular flaws in reasoning and research. As such, The Exclusive Society 
commends attention for the ways in which it dramatises these choices, and the 
different perils and pitfalls they inevitably entail.     
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